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Abstract
The modernization of the power system introduces technologies that may improve the system’s efficiency
by enhancing the capabilities of users. Despite their potential benefits, such technologies can have a negative
impact. This subject has widely analyzed, mostly considering for-profit electric utilities. However, the
literature has a gap regarding the impact of new technologies on non-profit utilities.
In this work, we quantify the price of anarchy of non-profit utilities, that is, the cost caused by lack of
coordination of users. We find that users, in the worst case, can consume up to twice the optimal demand,
obtaining a small fraction of the optimal surplus. For this reason, we leverage the theory of mechanism design
to design an incentive scheme that reduces the inefficiencies of the system, which preserves the privacy of
users. We illustrate with simulations the efficiency loss of the system and show two instances of incentive
mechanism that satisfy either budget balance and budget deficit.
Keywords: Smart grid, demand response, electricity market, dynamic pricing, game theory.
1. Introduction
Power systems are experiencing a innovation pro-
cess to improve multiple aspects, such as efficiency,
reliability, and security. Although new technologies
play an important role, the current modernization
endeavor requires the active participation of cus-
tomers. In particular, demand response programs
leverage communication and automation technolo-
gies so that customers can manage their loads ac-
cording to the system’s state. In this way, cus-
tomers can make better use of the available re-
sources and offer services, such as help reducing the
stress on the system or sell energy.
The literature on demand response focus mainly
on how to achieve different goals, such as reduce
demand peaks and/or improve the efficiency of the
system [1, 2]. These research works often consider
investor owned utilities, that is, firms focused on
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maximizing their profits; however, little attention
has been given to non-profit electric utilities (e.g.,
regulated or customer owned cooperatives).
Although investor owned utilities dominate the
electricity markets, non-profit electric cooperatives
play an important role in the economic develop-
ment [3]. Besides, electric cooperatives have prop-
erties that foster the social support for renewable
energy projects [4, 5, 6].1 On one hand, cooper-
atives offer transparency in the prices and allow
customers to control the source of energy. Thus,
the owners/members of an electric cooperative can
choose to support environmental or social objec-
tives, rather than maximize profits, as investor
owned firms.
On the other hand, cooperatives present the
renewable energy infrastructures as community
owned, which promotes their acceptance. Also, co-
operatives can inform about environmental issues
and give advice on how to reduce the environmental
impact, e.g., reducing the consumption of energy.2
1The REScoop.eu network has 1500 renewable energy co-
operatives in Europe [7].
2Other electric corporations profit with sales, so they do
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According to [6], the customers of Ecopower, a re-
newable energy cooperative from Belgium, reduced
their average demand from 4000 kWh/year to 3000
kWh/year within 3 years.
In this work we close a gap in the literature de-
signing a demand response approach for non-profit
utilities.3 First, we show that behavioral changes
enabled with new technologies can harm the sys-
tem’s efficiency to a large degree. This motivates
the design of an incentive scheme that reduces effi-
ciency losses. This research is important for electric
utilities, which face the challenge of adapting their
policies to account for new capabilities of their cus-
tomers.
1.1. Literature Review
The demand response literature often considers
the following objectives: reduce or shift the demand
peak, maximize the social welfare (the social satis-
faction with an allocation of resources), minimize
costs, or some combination of these goals [1, 8].
Maximizing the social welfare may encompass the
other objectives, because 1) maximizing the social
welfare, assuming inelastic demand, equals to mini-
mizing costs, and 2) reduction of demand peaks may
be necessary to improve the social welfare. How-
ever, these goals do not represent the objective of
regulated or non-profit utilities, because they prior-
itize the customer’s satisfaction over profits.
In general, both non-profit and regulated utilities
may choose electricity tariffs so that their revenues
amounts to the costs incurred to provide the service.
The cost aggregates both the operating expenses
(e.g., fuel, labor, and maintenance) and the cost of
the capital invested (e.g., interest, debt, and a fair
rate return to investors) [9]. In particular, the aver-
age cost pricing scheme guarantees that the utility
collects the estimated total cost.
Game theory has been widely used in demand
response studies to analyze interactions of selfish
agents with conflicting interests [10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15]. In this case, the conflict arises because cus-
tomers may compete for a limited resource. Some
research on demand response focus on setting up
the conditions (e.g., prices, incentives) so that self-
ish agents reach a desired social goal. In other
words, demand response attempts to coordinate
not have incentives to promote reductions in demand.
3Here we refer to non-profit utilities as customer owned
utilities, regulate utilities, or electric cooperatives.
agents whose individual actions could harm the so-
ciety.
The seminal work in [16] introduces the price of
anarchy, a measure to estimate the impact of lack of
coordination of agents. In our context, the price of
anarchy can quantify the effect of new technologies
that, although enhance the decision making capa-
bilities of customers, may not improve their coop-
eration. Thus, we can think of demand response
programs as efforts to reduce the price of anarchy
(i.e., to improve the efficiency of the system).
Previous works analyze possible problems created
by new technologies, such as stability [17, 18] or se-
curity issues [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In a way, these
works analyze the cost of ill designed demand re-
sponse schemes. However, the price of anarchy of-
fers a different perspective, which measure the cost
of not having demand response at all.
Some efforts have been made to analyzed the
price of anarchy of different systems. For exam-
ple, [24] analyzes the degradation of a network’s
performance due to unregulated traffic. Moreover,
[25] studies how users who anticipate the effect
of their actions reduce their utility in congestion
games. However, we are not aware of works that
analyze the price of anarchy of power systems with
non-profit utilities.
The literature has several mechanisms to prevent
efficiency losses in problems of resource allocation.
For example, [26] proposes a resource allocation
mechanism that has a bounded efficiency loss when
users anticipate prices. On the other hand, [27]
presents a pricing mechanism to implement efficient
outcomes in smart grids. Although relevant, these
works focus on maximizing the social welfare, that
is, they consider for-profit firms. Moreover, [28] pro-
poses the evolutionary implementation of a mecha-
nism that guarantees efficiency and stability. This
mechanism assumes that the payoff functions are
additively separable in the private information of
users.
Works such as [29, 30] propose decentralized
mechanisms to allocate efficiently bandwidth in net-
works. These mechanisms satisfy the budget balance
property,4 but require a multidimensional message
space, because users must report their desired allo-
cation and the price they are willing to pay for each
link of the network.
4The mechanism does not need external subsidies nor im-
poses taxes on the users.
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Previous works analyze the dependence of the
message space with the efficiency of the mecha-
nism. For instance, [31] analyzes the minimum
space required to implement optimal allocations in
exchange economies, which is larger than the num-
ber of participants and resources. Furthermore, [32]
shows that one-dimensional message spaces are un-
suitable to achieve optimal allocations on contrac-
tive games (games whose best response is a contrac-
tion mapping).
1.2. Contributions
At a high level, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We analyze the efficiency loss (price of anarchy)
in power systems with non-profit utilities (most
of the literature in demand response considers
for profit-utilities).
• We propose an incentive mechanism to prevent
inefficiencies and preserves the privacy of the
customers.
• We illustrate the efficiency loss and the efficacy
of the mechanism through simulations.
We leverage the theory of mechanism design to
propose an incentive scheme that reduces the effi-
ciency loss. Our incentives scheme is based on the
Clarke pivot mechanism [33] and preserves private
information using a one-dimensional message space
per each resource to be allocated.5 We manage to
design a mechanism that uses a one-dimensional
space (to allocate a single resource) thanks to the
properties of the system. This is possible because
the wealth of each agent depends on their actions
and the aggregate actions of other agents. Thus, we
can decentralize decisions by sending to each agent
the aggregated demand, which is one-dimensional.
Likewise, users report their demand (a one dimen-
sional signal) to the utility. The structure of the
proposed mechanism is similar in philosophy to the
mechanism in [34]; however, in our case users do
not communicate their marginal payoff function.
We extend the works previously published in
[35, 36] in several ways: 1) we find that the effi-
ciency loss takes place with an overuse of resources
5A one-dimensional message space reduces the technical
requirements of the system and also protects the privacy of
the customers, since they do not report their electricity con-
sumption preferences.
(in the inefficient equilibrium the demand can dou-
ble the optimal value); 2) we prove that, in the
worst case, the efficiency loss with strategic agents
is arbitrarily large; 3) we show two instances of
incentives that satisfy individual rationality (i.e.,
users have always positive surplus) and have either
budget deficit or budget surplus; and 4) we general-
ize previous results relaxing restrictions on the price
function, we only assume that the generation cost
function is strictly convex.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we introduce the electricity system
model. We show that the average pricing scheme
leads to optimal outcomes when users have lim-
ited capabilities, i.e., when they lack technologies
to plan strategically their actions. Then, we show
that strategic behaviors harm the systems efficiency.
In particular, the main result of the paper shows
that users have incentives to consume up to twice
the optimal demand, which in turn reduces signifi-
cantly the system’s efficiency. In Section 3 we pro-
pose and analyze an incentives scheme to reach the
optimal equilibrium with strategic users. We show
two instances of the incentives that satisfy differ-
ent properties. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 4.
2. Background
In this section we introduce a model of the power
system6 and analyze the system’s equilibrium with
two types of users, namely non-strategic and strate-
gic, which describe users before and after the intro-
duction of DR technologies, respectively. The main
results of this section show that strategic behaviors
damage the efficiency of the electricity system. In
the worst case, strategic customers consume twice
the optimal amount of energy, causing an arbitrar-
ily large efficiency degradation.
2.1. Notation
We denote vectors with bold font. Let q be a
vector of size N . Thus, we define q−i as a vector
with the elements of q, except the ith, i.e., q−i =
[q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . , qN ]. The norm ‖·‖ represents
6Here we assume that a non-profit electric utility provides
both generation, transmission, and distribution. Thus, the
electric utility manages the whole system.
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Table 1: List of symbols.
Symbol Description
N Number of customers
P Set of customers
qi Demand of the i
th customer
q Demand of the population
g Total demand
C Generation cost function
p Unitary price of energy
ti Payment of the i
th customer
vi Valuation function
Ui Profit of the i
th customer
σi Set of available strategies
G Game
µ Optimal demand
ξ Nash equilibrium
r Efficiency ratio
M Mechanism
I Incentive function
Id Incentive with budget deficit
Is Incentive with budget surplus
Wi Profit with the incentives
GI Game with incentives
h Estimation of the electricity price
o Outcome function
the L1-norm, that is, ‖q‖ =
∑N
i=1 |qi|. Finally, f˙
and f¨ denote the first and second derivatives of the
function f , respectively. Table 1 summarizes the
symbols used in the document.
2.2. Model of the Electricity System
We consider a non-profit utility that provides en-
ergy to a population P = {1, . . . , N} with N cus-
tomers. Let us denote by C(g) the total cost to
supply a demand of g units of energy.7 For sim-
plicity, we ignore transmission losses, therefore, the
total energy generated equals the total demand, i.e.,
g =
∑
i∈P qi , where qi ≥ 0 is the demand of the
ith user.
We define the profit of users as the benefit earned
minus the cost of the energy consumed. Here we
quantify the benefit of the ith user through a valua-
tion function vi : R≥0 → R, where vi(qi) represents
the monetary value that the user assigns to qi units
7C(g) includes operation costs, such as generation, trans-
mission, and a fair return for the utility.
of energy.8 Besides, the ith user pays qip(g) for
its consumption, where p(g) is the unitary price of
energy, which depends on the total demand g. In
summary, the profit of the ith consumer is
Ui(qi, g) = vi(qi)− qip(g).
We make the following assumption regarding the
functions of the model.
Assumption 1.
1. The valuation function vi : R≥0 → R is
twice differentiable, concave, non-decreasing,
and satisfies vi(0) = 0.
2. The cost function C : R≥0 → R≥0 is differen-
tiable, strictly convex, and satisfies C(g) > 0 if
g > 0.
3. The average cost p(g) = C(g)
g
is monotonically
increasing, therefore, p˙(g) ≥ 0 for g > 0.
The electricity tariff p(·) and the behavior of
users determine the equilibrium of the system.9
In traditional power systems users cannot observe
changes in prices, therefore, we assume that they
cannot manifest strategic behaviors. However, new
technologies grant users more information and capa-
bilities to make decisions. Hence, users can develop
strategies to anticipate the effect of their actions
in the prices [33]. Below we show that the aver-
age cost price is the optimal tariff in systems with
non-strategic users. Latter we prove that the self-
interest of strategic users can degrade the efficiency
of the electricity system .
2.3. System with Non-strategic Users
Here we define the behavior of users before intro-
ducing DR technologies. Let us denote the surplus
of non-strategic users as
U˜i(qi, p˜) = vi(qi)− qip˜, i ∈ P , (1)
where p˜ ∈ R is the price observed by the users. Ra-
tional users will select the demand that maximizes
8The valuation function reflects the benefit consuming qi
units of energy. For instance, a concave valuation function,
such as vi(qi) = log(1 + qi), indicates that the value of an
additional resource decreases with the total number of re-
sources qi.
9The equilibrium of a power system has the form of a
Nash equilibrium, which describes situations where no user
has incentives to change its demand unilaterally (see Defini-
tion 2).
4
their surplus, given the constant price p˜ that they
observe. Hence, each user solves the following opti-
mization problem
maximize
qi
U˜i(qi, p˜) = vi(qi)− qip˜
subject to qi ≥ 0.
From Assumption 1 the surplus in (1) is concave;
hence, the previous problem has a unique solution,
denoted by q˜i, which satisfies [37, 38, 39]{
q˜i = 0 if v˙i(0) < p˜,
v˙i(q˜i)− p˜ = 0 otherwise.
(2)
The previous expression implies that all users with
positive demand (q˜i > 0) have the same marginal
valuation in the equilibrium.
The utility can select price schemes that allow
users reach efficient demand profiles (or allocations
of resources) acting independently. Below, we intro-
duce the concept of Pareto optimal allocation and
leverage the second welfare theorem to show that
the average pricing scheme leads to a Pareto opti-
mal allocation.10
2.3.1. Pareto Optimality
We define the Pareto efficiency criteria as follows
[40]:
Definition 1. An allocation q˜ = [q˜1, . . . , q˜N ] is
Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient), given some
price p˜, if there is no other allocation qˆ such that
U˜i(qˆi, p˜) ≥ U˜i(q˜i, p˜) for all i ∈ P, with strict in-
equality for some i ∈ P.
From this definition, it follows that an allocation
q˜ that maximizes the consumer surplus, defined
as
∑
i U˜i(q˜i, p˜), is Pareto optimal. In other words,
no other allocation qˆ would improve the benefit of
users without affecting any of them, otherwise, qˆ
would attain a higher social surplus than q˜, which
leads to a contradiction.
2.3.2. Optimality of the Average Cost Pricing
With the following optimization problem we ex-
press the problem of finding the system’s equilib-
rium, represented by the tuple (p˜, q˜), that maxi-
10In a Pareto optimal allocation no user can be made bet-
ter off without another being made worse off.
mizes the customer surplus
maximize
q1,...,qN ,p
∑
i∈P
U˜i(qi, p)
subject to C (‖q‖)− ‖q‖ p ≤ 0, (3a)
qi(v˙i(qi)− p) = 0, i ∈ P (3b)
qi ≥ 0, i ∈ P .
The restriction in (3a) is a budget constraint re-
quired to guarantee that the total payments by the
users (‖q‖ p) cover the production costs C (‖q‖).11
Moreover, (3b) captures the optimal response of the
users (conditions in (2)). The following result shows
that a system with the average cost pricing has a
Pareto efficient equilibrium that maximizes the cus-
tomer surplus.
Theorem 1. Consider non-strategic users with sur-
plus given by (1) and a generator with cost C(·) sat-
isfying Assumption 1. Then, the average cost price
function
p (g) = C (g)/g , (4)
leads to a Pareto equilibrium.
The Appendix contains the proof of this and the
remaining results.
2.4. System with Strategic Users
In this subsection we formulate the profit of
strategic users as a function of both the total de-
mand g = ‖q‖ and the user’s demand qi
12
Ui
(
qi, q−i
)
= vi(qi)− ti(q), i ∈ P , (5)
where
ti(q) = qip (‖q‖) (6)
represents the payment function of the ith user. We
make the following assumption to guarantee that
the profit of the individuals Ui(qi, q−i) is concave.
Assumption 2. The payment ti(q) in (6) is in-
creasing convex with respect to qi. Furthermore, the
marginal payment ∂ti(q)
∂qi
= p (‖q‖)+ qip˙ (‖q‖) is in-
creasing with respect to qi.
11In practice, the operational restrictions of some genera-
tors (e.g., large start up costs) may force them to run even
when they incur in losses, provided that they compensate
the losses in future periods. Hence, the restriction in (3a)
refers to the long run operation [41].
12 Users must reveal their consumption only to the utility
company, which in turn computes and broadcast the aggre-
gate demand.
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As users improve their decision capabilities, the
system’s equilibrium changes; however, the sys-
tem’s efficiency may decrease. Before analyzing the
efficiency of the system, we need introduce both the
optimal equilibrium and the equilibrium that users
reach pursuing their own interests. Later we inves-
tigate the relation between these equilibria.
2.4.1. Optimal Equilibrium
The demand µ ∈ RN≥0 that maximizes the cus-
tomer surplus (our efficiency metric), given the av-
erage cost price, solves the following optimization
problem
maximize
q1,...,qN
∑
i∈P
Ui
(
qi, q−i
)
=
∑
i∈P
vi(qi)− C (‖q‖)
subject to qi ≥ 0, i ∈ P .
From Assumption 1 the consumer surplus is strictly
concave, therefore, there is a unique optimal solu-
tion that satisfies the following conditions [37]
{
µi = 0 if v˙i(0) < C˙(‖µ‖),
v˙i(µi) = C˙(‖µ‖) otherwise.
(7)
2.4.2. Nash Equilibrium
We analyze the interactions of users using the
Cournot competition model, in which users individ-
ually and simultaneously select the quantity that
they want to consume [42, 40]. Particularly, we de-
fine the game as a 3-tuple G = 〈P , (Σi)i∈P , (Ui)i∈P 〉,
where P is the set of players (or customers), Σi =
R≥0 is the set of available strategies (consumption
of electricity) and Ui : Σ1 × · · · × ΣN → R is the
surplus function of the ith player.
The equilibrium concept used in game theory is
the Nash equilibrium (NE) [43, 44], defined as fol-
lows.
Definition 2. The Nash equilibrium of a game
G, denoted by ξ ∈ RN≥0, satisfies Ui(ξi, ξ−i) ≥
Ui(qi, ξ−i), for all qi ∈ R≥0, for every user i ∈ P.
From this definition we know that rational agents
will choose ξi when the other users choose ξ−i. In
other words, ξi is the demand that solves the fol-
lowing optimization problem
maximize
qi
Ui (qi, ξ−i)
subject to qi ≥ 0.
(8)
From Assumption 2 we know that the problem in
(8) is concave, and therefore, it has only one solu-
tion (given some ξ−i) that satisfies the following
conditions{
ξi = 0 if v˙i(0) < p (||ξ||) ,
v˙i(ξi) = p (||ξ||) + ξip˙ (||ξ||) otherwise.
(9)
Moreover, we can use the results by Rosen [45, The-
orem 2] to prove that the Nash equilibrium of G,
denoted by ξ, is unique.
2.4.3. Electricity System Inefficiency
From the equilibrium conditions in (7) and (9) we
know that µ 6= ξ. In other words, the user’s indi-
vidual interests are not aligned with the collective
interests. Particularly, the following result shows
that users consume more resources in the NE.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satis-
fied. Let µ and ξ be the optimal and the Nash equi-
librium (see (7) and (9)), respectively. Then, all
users consume more resources in the NE, that is,
ξi ≥ µi, for all i ∈ P.
We use the concepts of the tragedy of the com-
mons and the price of anarchy to analyze the ef-
ficiency loss13 of the electricity system. On one
hand, the tragedy of the commons is a situation in
which the self interest of users leads to overuse of
resources, despite of the harm to the society [46].
This occurs because the negative effects are shared
by the community. Pitifully, the benefit of the com-
munity decreases when all individuals overuse re-
sources. We define the tragedy of the commons as
follows.
Definition 3 (Tragedy of the commons). At the
optimal outcome, every agent has incentives to con-
sume more resources.
Observe that the game G suffers the tragedy of
the commons, since: i) every user has incentives
to consume more than the optimal value of energy
(ξi ≥ µi); and ii) the self interest leads to an unde-
sired social outcome. In particular, the next result
shows that users can consume twice the optimal de-
mand in the NE (when the price function p(·) is
linear).
13Here we use the customer surplus as the efficiency met-
ric; hence, the efficiency loss refers to the degradation of
the customer surplus in the NE with respect to the optimal
outcome.
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Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied
and assume that C˙(·) is unbounded. If the users
have the same valuation function with v˙i(0) > p(0)
and if the price function p(·) is linear, then the de-
mand ratio ‖ξ‖/‖µ‖ → 2 as N →∞.
On the other hand, the price of anarchy is the ra-
tio between the worst possible NE and the social op-
timum [47, 33]. The next Theorem shows that the
price of anarchy equals zero, that is, the customer
surplus in the worst case NE is arbitrarily smaller
than customer surplus in the social optimum. In
contrast, systems with marginal cost prices, reduce
their efficiency in at most 1/4 [25].
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satis-
fied and assume that C˙(·) is unbounded . Let µ
and ξ be the optimal and the Nash equilibrium (see
(7) and (9)), respectively. Then, the efficiency loss,
that is, the ratio of the customer surplus with the
worst case NE and that of the optimal outcome, sat-
isfies
r(ξ,µ) =
∑
i vi(ξi)− ‖ξ‖ p(‖ξ‖)∑
i vi(µi)− ‖µ‖ p(‖µ‖)
≥ 0, (10)
with equality when all users have the same linear
valuation with v˙i(0) > p(0), p(·) is linear, and N →
∞.
Remark 1. According to Theorem 3, the worst
case of efficiency loss occurs when N → ∞. Here
we are not suggesting that the population grows to
infinity, but that the efficiency loss aggravates with
the size of the population.
We can model the impact of inelastic loads by set-
ting a minimum demand for each user (to account
for the demand of appliances that do not react to
prices). The total demand with these restrictions,
denoted ||µˆ||, may be higher than the optimal de-
mand without restrictions, that is, ||µ|| ≤ ||µˆ|| ≤
||ξ||. Thus, we can conjecture that inelastic loads
can reduce the efficiency loss, because they can re-
duce the distance between the optimal and the in-
efficient demand.
Example 1. Let us illustrate loss of efficiency of
the customer surplus as a function of the number of
users N . Here we use the following linear valuation
function
vi(qi) = αiqi,
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Figure 1: Ratio of demand and efficiency ratio as a function
of the number of users N . In the worst case the demand
ratio tends to 2 and the efficiency ratio (see (10)) tends to 0
as N → ∞.
where the parameter αi characterizes the valuation
of the ith agent (we select αi = 10 for all i ∈ P).
On the other hand, we define a quadratic generation
cost function C(q) = βq2+bq, and the unitary price
function as p(g) = C(g)/g = βg+b, where β = 1 and
b = 1. Since all users have the same valuation func-
tion and v˙i(0) < p(0), then the individual demand
is positive (see (9)).
Fig. 1 shows the ratio of demand and efficiency
ratio as a function of the number of users N .14
On one hand, Fig. 1a shows that the demand ratio
‖ξ‖ / ‖µ‖ closes to 2 for large populations, as ex-
pected from Lemma 1. On the other hand, Fig. 1b
shows that the efficiency ratio r(ξ,µ) tends to
zero, confirming the worst efficiency loss from The-
orem 3.
These results show that lack of coordination
harms the efficiency of the system. In particular,
the users can consume up to twice the optimal de-
mand and obtain a small fraction of the optimal
surplus. Next we propose an incentive scheme that
mitigates the system’s inefficiencies.
14Section 5.5 has details on the optimization method used
in the experiments.
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g =
∑
i qi
Utility
qi ∈ arg max
x
i
Ui(xi, g) + I(xi, g)qi ∈ arg max
x
i
Ui(xi, g) + I(xi, g)qi ∈ arg max
x
i
Ui(xi, g) + I(xi, g)
Users
g
q1, . . . , qN
Figure 2: Scheme of a decentralized price mechanism. The
utility broadcasts the total demand so that each agent can
determine its optimal demand.
3. Incentives-Based Mechanism
The efficiency loss of the Nash equilibrium mo-
tivates the design of an incentives mechanism to
improve the equilibrium in strategic environments
[40, 48]. In this section, we introduce a price mech-
anism that improves the efficiency of the system
when users are strategic. Also, we show two in-
stances of the mechanism with different properties.
From the perspective of mechanism design, the
principal (in this case the utility) can design the
payoff structure of the game to reach a desired so-
cial goal. Hence, the principal intervenes to guar-
antee that selfish users reach an equilibrium that
maximizes the customer surplus; this considering
the private information held by each agent, nec-
essary to calculate the optimal outcome. Sum-
marizing, mechanism design consists in designing
a solution system to a decentralized optimization
problem with private information [48]. A mech-
anism M = {Σ1, . . . ,ΣN , o(·)} defines a set of
strategies Σi for each player and an outcome rule
o : Σ1 × . . . × ΣN → O that maps from the set of
possible strategies to the set of possible outcomes
O [40].
Here we propose an indirect revelation mecha-
nism, which avoids the revelation of private infor-
mation, and uses a one-dimensional message space
(see Fig. 2). In this mechanism, the users commu-
nicate their demand qi to the principal, who in turn
calculates and broadcasts the total demand ‖q‖ to
the users.15 Then, users use the incoming informa-
tion to adjust their demand. In this mechanism the
users have the same strategy space ((Σi)i∈P) as in
the original system (game G).
15 We assume that the utility’s infrastructure prevent users
from tampering their electricity meters to misreport their
demand. Nonetheless, the principal can calculate the total
demand indirectly, inquiring the total generated energy. In
other words, the principal can use the feedback of the phys-
ical world to gather information.
The outcome rule o(·) of the mechanism re-
turns the payment for each user; hence, o(·) =
[o1(·), . . . , oN (·)] and the outcome space is O ≡ R
N
≥0.
The outcome rule o(·) must guarantee that the
game has a NE equal to the optimal outcome µ.
To this end, we modify the payment function ti(·)
adding an incentive Ii(·) that aligns the users’ profit
with the population’s objective function (customer
surplus). We achieve this by selecting a function
Ii(·) that estimates the externalities (or the impact
on prices) caused by the ith user.
Let the payment of the ith user be
oi(q) = ti(q) + Ii(q), (11)
with incentives of the form
Ii(q) = I(qi, ‖q‖) =
∥∥q−i∥∥ (h(∥∥q−i∥∥)− p (‖q‖)) ,
(12)
where
∥∥q−i∥∥ = ‖q‖ − qi and the function h(∥∥q−i∥∥)
estimates the electricity price without the ith user
in the system. We choose this incentive structure
because each user only knows its own demand qi
and the total demand ‖q‖, ignoring the precise de-
mand of other users. Furthermore, we assume that
users are indistinguishable in the system; hence,
two users with the same demand impose the same
externalities to the system. The form of this incen-
tive is related to the price used in the VCG mecha-
nism [33] and some payoff functions used in poten-
tial games [49].
Introducing the incentives in (12) we obtain
a new game defined as the 3-tuple GI =
〈P , (Σi)i∈P , (Wi)i∈P 〉, where P is the set of players,
Σi is the set of available strategies of each player,
and Wi : Σ1×· · ·×ΣN → R is the surplus function
of the ith player, defined as
Wi(qi, q−i) = vi(qi) + oi(q) = Ui(qi, q−i) + Ii(q)
= vi(qi)− ‖q‖ p (‖q‖) + ||q−i||hi(
∥∥q−i∥∥).
Observe that the NE of the game GI has the same
equilibrium conditions than the optimal outcome in
Section 2.4.1; hence, the NE of GI is equal to the
optimal equilibrium µ.
3.1. Mechanism’s Properties
Now we analyze the properties of the incentive
mechanism and provide of two instances that have
different properties. First, let us define some desir-
able properties of mechanisms, namely budget bal-
ance and individual rationality.
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3.1.1. Budget Balance
It is desirable to make the net payments equal
to zero, that is, guarantee that the sum of charges
is equal to the total cost [33]. In this way the sys-
tem doesn’t require external subsidies nor imposes
taxes on the population. This property is known as
budget balance, and is defined as follows
Definition 4. A mechanism that implements pay-
ments oi(·) is budget balanced if
∑
i∈P oi(q) =
C(‖q‖).
Note that the original game (G) satisfies the bud-
get balance property, because the total payments
equal the generation cost (see (4)). Therefore, we
need that
∑
i∈P Ii(q) = 0 to preserve the budget
balance in GI . However, the next theorem shows
that it is impossible to find a function h(·) that bal-
ances the amount of rewards (price discounts) and
penalties (price increment) imposed to customers.
Consequently, the mechanism requires either inflow
or outflow of resources.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satis-
fied and let p(·) be the average cost price function.
Then there is no function h(·) such that a mech-
anism with payments defined by (11) satisfies the
budget balance property.
This result is an analogous to the Myerson-
Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [50], which
states the impossibility of designing a mechanisms
with ex-post efficiency and without external subsi-
dies in games between two parties. However, Theo-
rem 4 considers a particular case with 1) nonlinear
prices (subject to Assumption 1) and 2) the cus-
tomer surplus as the maximization criteria, rather
than the aggregate surplus.
3.1.2. Individual Rationality
The utility company cannot force users to sign
contracts accepting the incentives scheme. Hence,
the mechanism must ensure that every user volun-
tarily decides to join the system with incentives
(game GI). In particular, a rational user would ac-
cept a mechanism if it guarantees higher benefits
participating. This property is called individual
rationality and is defined as
Definition 5. A mechanism is individual rational
if the surplus at the equilibrium is larger than zero,
that is, Wi(µ) ≥ 0.
The following result shows the conditions to guar-
antee that the proposed mechanism satisfies the in-
dividual rationality.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied.
Consider a mechanisms with payments given by
(11). If h(
∥∥µ−i∥∥)− p(∥∥µ−i∥∥) ≥ 0, then the mecha-
nism is individually rational.
3.2. Examples of Incentives
Here we present two instances of individual ratio-
nal incentives that satisfy either budget deficit or
surplus. On one hand, the following result shows
an instance of a mechanism that has budget deficit,
that is,
∑
i∈P oi(q) ≤ 0. This implies that the
mechanism requires external subsidies to operate.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. A
mechanism with payments given by (11) with
h(g) = p (g) (13)
satisfies the individual rationality property and has
budget deficit, i.e.,
∑
i∈P oi(q) ≤ C(‖q‖) (or equiv-
alently
∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≤ 0).
On the other hand, the following result shows
a mechanism that has budget surplus, that is,∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≥ 0, which implies that the mechanism
imposes taxes on users.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. A
mechanism with payments given by (11) with
h(g) = p
(
N
N − 1
g
)
(14)
satisfies the individual rationality property and has
budget surplus, i.e.,
∑
i∈P oi(q) ≥ C(‖q‖) (or
equivalently
∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≥ 0).
Table 2 shows a summary of the properties of
incentives with h(·) given by (13) and (14), denoted
Id(·) and Is(·), respectively.
Example 2. Let us illustrate the effect of incen-
tives in the customer surplus as a function of the
number of users. In this case we use nonlinear val-
uation functions of the form
vi(qi) = αi log(1 + qi),
with
αi = 10 +
i− 1
N − 1
.
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Figure 3: Customer surplus with and without incentives
for different population sizes. The mechanism with budget
deficit generates less profit for the users, but the profit is
positive.
If the unitary price function is p(g) = C(g)/g =
βg + b, then the incentives from Table 2 are
Isi (q) =
∥∥q−i∥∥ βN − 1 (
∥∥q−i∥∥− qi(N − 1))
and
Idi (q) = −
∥∥q−i∥∥βqi.
Fig. 3 shows that the mechanism with budget
deficit (Id) generates less profit for the society, but
the profit is positive (because the mechanism is indi-
vidual rational). Furthermore, the mechanism with
budget surplus (Is) does not have a notorious ef-
fect in the customer surplus (in the simulations
0 ≤
∑
i∈P I
s
i (q) ≤ 0.0983).
4. Conclusions and Future Directions
In this work we find that, without a proper co-
ordination, users who become strategic (thanks to
new technologies) can harm the efficiency of the
power system. Particularly, with the average cost
prices, the efficiency loss can be arbitrarily large,
while systems that use marginal cost prices have an
efficiency loss of at most 1/4 [25]. Furthermore,
in the worst case NE the users consume twice the
optimal energy.
We propose an indirect revelation mechanism to
improve the efficiency of the system. Our mech-
anism uses a one dimensional message space and
avoids revelation of private information. We show
two instances of the mechanism that satisfy either
budget deficit or budget surplus. Furthermore, the
properties of the mechanism guarantee that users
would join the incentives program voluntarily, since
they have non-negative surplus.
In this work, we use a stylized power system
model to facilitate the analysis, however, it is im-
portant to consider the stochastic nature of both
demand and generation and temporal interdepen-
dencies of the demand.
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5. Appendix
In this section we include the proofs of the results
introduced in the paper.
5.1. Optimal Price Function in Non-strategic Set-
tings
The following proof demonstrates that the aver-
age cost price function maximizes the customer sur-
plus when users are non-strategic.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof has two steps.
First, we show that the system’s equilibrium (p˜, q˜),
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with p˜ = C (‖q˜‖) / ‖q˜‖ (the average cost evalu-
ated at the efficient outcome q˜) maximizes the cus-
tomer surplus of non-strategic users (see (3)). How-
ever, the optimal price p˜, which is constant, de-
pends on the optimal allocation, which is unknown
beforehand. In the second step we show that a
power system with the average cost price function
p(‖q‖) = C (‖q‖)/‖q‖ clears with the efficient al-
location q˜. In other words, with the average cost
price function the system’s equilibrium maximizes
the customer surplus.
Step (i): Let us define the restrictions of the
optimization problem in (3) as
Ψ(q, p) = C (‖q‖)− ‖q‖ p (15)
and
Φi(qi, p) = qi(v˙i(qi)− p), (16)
where (p, q) is a system’s equilibrium. The La-
grangian of the problem in (3) is
L(q, p,λ,η) =
∑
i
U˜i(qi, p)− λ0Ψ(q, p)
−
∑
i
ηiΦi(qi, p) +
∑
i
λiqi,
where λ = [λ0, . . . , λN ] and η = [η1, . . . , ηN ]. The
tuple that maximizes the customer surplus, denoted
(p˜, q˜), satisfies the following first order necessary
conditions [38, 39]
∂L(q˜, p˜,λ,η)
∂p
=
∑
i
q˜i(λ0 − 1) +
∑
i
ηiq˜i = 0,
(17)
∂L(q˜, p˜,λ,η)
∂qi
= φi−λ0ψ−ηi(φi+q˜iv¨i(q˜i))+λi = 0,
(18)
Φi(q˜i, p˜) = 0,
λ0Ψ(q˜, p˜) = 0, (19)
λiq˜i = 0, (20)
with φi = v˙i(q˜i) − p˜, ψ = C˙ (‖q˜‖)− p˜, λk ≥ 0, and
ηi ≥ 0, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
Let us assume by contradiction that the cost re-
striction (15) does not bind. Therefore, Ψ(q˜, p˜) ≤ 0,
which implies that p˜ ≥ C (‖q˜‖) / ‖q˜‖ > 0 (the
rightmost inequality follows because C(‖q˜‖) > 0
if ‖q˜‖ > 0). Thus, we need λ0 = 0 to satisfy (19).
Moreover, for every user i with q˜i > 0 we have
λi = 0 and φi = 0 to satisfy (20) and Φi(q˜i, p˜) = 0
(see the equality constraint in (16)). Also, when
q˜i > 0, ηi must be positive to satisfy (17).
With the previous considerations (18) becomes
ηiq˜iv¨i(q˜i) = 0. (21)
Observe that if the valuation function vi(·) is con-
cave, then v¨i(q˜i) ≤ 0. Thus, (21) holds only if
v¨i(q˜i) = 0; however, since φi = 0, we know that
v˙i(q˜i) = p˜ = 0. This leads to a contradiction, be-
cause p˜ ≥ C (‖q˜‖) / ‖q˜‖ > 0. In conclusion, the
cost constraint in (15) must bind in the equilibrium
that maximizes the customer surplus. Hence, the
price at the equilibrium is equal to the average cost.
Step (ii): Now, let us use the average cost pric-
ing function p(‖q‖) = C (‖q‖) / ‖q‖ instead of a
constant price. Here we intend to prove that the
system has only one equilibrium, which corresponds
to the Pareto optimal allocation.
Let us assume by contradiction that the system
has two equilibria, namely the optimal allocation q˜
and a different allocation qˆ with q˜i 6= qˆi for some
i ∈ P . First, let us assume that q˜i > qˆi > 0, then,
v˙i(q˜i) < v˙i(qˆi). Our previous hypothesis, together
with the optimal response of users (see (2)) and the
average cost pricing, leads to
v˙i(q˜i) = p˜(‖q˜‖) < v˙i(qˆi) = pˆ(‖qˆ‖). (22)
Since all users have the same marginal valuation,
the previous expression holds for every user with
positive demand. This implies that q˜i > qˆi for every
i with qˆi > 0; hence, we conclude that ‖q˜‖ > ‖qˆ‖.
Observe that (22) is true if the tariff p(·) strictly
decreases with the total consumption, which con-
tradicts Assumption 1.
Hence, our initial assumption that q˜i > qˆi is false.
Furthermore, we can construct a similar argument
to show that q˜i < qˆi is false as well. Therefore, the
system with the average pricing function allows only
one equilibrium, which corresponds to the efficient
allocation.
5.2. Efficiency Loss in Strategic Settings
This proof shows that the optimal equilibrium
and the NE in strategic settings are distinct; hence,
this result shows that the system’s NE is inefficient.
The next section investigates the efficiency loss in
the NE with respect to the optimal equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2. In this proof we show first
that ||µ|| ≤ ||ξ|| and then we prove that µj ≤ ξj for
all j.
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First, let us assume by contradiction that ‖ξ‖ <
‖µ‖, hence, there exist some j such that µj > ξj >
0 with the following equilibrium condition (see (7))
v˙j(µj) = C˙(‖µ‖) ≥ C˙(‖ξ‖),
where C˙(g) = p(g)+gp˙(g) (see (4)). We can use the
equilibrium conditions in (9) to express the previous
inequality as
v˙j(µj) ≥ v˙j(ξj) + (‖ξ‖ − ξj)p˙(‖ξ‖). (23)
Since µj > ξj , then v˙j(µj) < v˙j(ξj), because vi(·) is
concave and increasing; hence, (23) is true if (‖ξ‖−
ξj)p˙(‖ξ‖) < 0, which is not possible, since ‖ξ‖ −
ξi ≥ 0 and p˙(·) > 0 (see Assumption 1). From this
contradiction we conclude that ‖ξ‖ ≥ ‖µ‖.
Now, let us assume by contradiction that there
exists some j such that µj > ξj . With the same
argument used at the beginning of the proof we
conclude that
v˙j(µj) = C˙(‖µ‖) ≤ C˙(‖ξ‖)
= v˙j(ξj) + (‖ξ‖ − ξj)p˙(‖ξ‖).
However, the previous expression requires that
(‖ξ‖ − ξj)p˙(‖ξ‖) < 0, which is not possible. There-
fore, we conclude that µj ≤ ξj for all j ∈ P .
5.3. Price of Anarchy
Here we undertake the task of investigating the
price of anarchy when users become strategic. First,
we analyze how the total demand changes as the
number of users increases. Later, we find the condi-
tions in which the ratio of demand ‖ξ‖/‖µ‖ reaches
the upper bound. These results allow us to prove
that the efficiency loss is arbitrarily large.
The first result shows that the total demand of
the system cannot decrease as the number of users
increases. In particular, it can occur that only a
subset of users with high valuations can afford the
electricity prices (see (9)). Hence, the demand does
not necessarily increase as the population grows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 is sat-
isfied and let ξ and ξˆ be the Nash equilibrium of two
systems with P and Pˆ users, respectively. If P ⊆ Pˆ,
then ‖ξ‖ ≤ ‖ξˆ‖.
Proof. We assume by contradiction that the total
demand in the NE strictly decreases with the num-
ber of users, that is, ‖ξ‖ > ‖ξˆ‖. Hence, at least one
user j ∈ P reduces its demand, that is, there exists
some j such that ξj > ξˆj > 0. From (9) we know
that ξˆj satisfies
v˙j(ξˆj) = t˙j(ξˆ) = p
(
‖ξˆ‖
)
+ ξˆj p˙
(
‖ξˆ‖
)
. (24)
The right hand side of (24) is increasing with re-
spect to ξˆj (see Assumption 1). Therefore, we
can find an upper bound of v˙j(ξˆj) replacing in the
right hand side of (24) ξˆj by kj = δ + ξˆj , where
δ = ‖ξ‖ − ‖ξˆ‖ > 0 (the inequality follows from our
initial assumption), resulting
v˙j(ξˆj) < p (‖ξ‖) + ξˆj p˙ (‖ξ‖) + δp˙ (‖ξ‖) . (25)
Now, we can use our hypothesis ξj > ξˆj and (24) to
obtain an upper bound of (25)
p (‖ξ‖) + ξˆj p˙ (‖ξ‖) < p (‖ξ‖) + ξj p˙ (‖ξ‖) = v˙j(ξj).
(26)
Thus, from (25) and (26) we have
v˙j(ξˆj) < v˙j(ξj) + δp˙ (‖ξ‖) .
From Assumption 1 we know that p˙(‖ξ‖) > 0.
Since δ > 0, (25) implies that ξˆj > ξj , contradicting
our initial assumption. Therefore we conclude that
the total demand cannot decrease with the number
of users, i.e., ‖ξ‖ ≤ ‖ξˆ‖.
The following result shows some conditions to
guarantee that all users have a positive demand.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satis-
fied. If all users have the same valuation function
(vi(x) = v(x) for all x ≥ 0) and v˙(0) > p (0), then
they will have positive demand in the equilibrium,
i.e., ξi > 0 for all i ∈ P.
Proof. If all users have the same valuation function,
then they will have the same demand, that is, ξi =
ξ for all i ∈ P and ||ξ|| = Nξ. Therefore, the
equilibrium conditions in (9) become{
ξ = 0 if v˙(0) < p (0) ,
v˙(ξ) = p (Nξ) + ξp˙ (Nξ) Otherwise.
Observe that v˙(ξ) is decreasing and p(Nξ)+ξp˙(Nξ)
is increasing (see Assumption 2). Therefore, if
v˙(0) > p (0), then there exists some ξ > 0 such
that v˙(ξ) = p (Nξ) + ξp˙ (Nξ).
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In order to analyze the case in which every user
has a positive demand, we assume that all users
have the same valuation with v˙i(0) > p(0) for all in
i ∈ P . In this way we guarantee that ξi > 0 (see
Lemma 2). The next Corollary shows that under
the previous conditions the total demand strictly
increases with the size of the population N .
Corollary 1. Consider the conditions of Proposi-
tion 4. If all users have identical valuation func-
tions with v˙i(0) > p(0), then the total demand in
the NE strictly increases with the number of users,
that is, ‖ξ‖ < ‖ξˆ‖.
Proof. Let P = {1, . . . , N} and Pˆ = P ∪ {N + 1}.
Let all the users have the same valuation function,
that is, vi(x) = vj(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R and
i, j ∈ Pˆ. Consequently, all users will have the same
demand, in other words, ξi = ξ i ∈ P and ξˆj = ξˆ for
all j ∈ Pˆ and the total demand for each system will
be equal to ‖ξ‖ = Nξ and ‖ξˆ‖ = (N+1)ξˆ. Further-
more, if v˙(0) > p(0), then ξ, ξˆ 6= 0 (see Lemma 2).
Let us assume by contradiction that both systems
have the same demand, i.e., ‖ξ‖ = ‖ξˆ‖ = g, which
leads to N
N+1ξ = ξˆ. Therefore, the larger popu-
lation consumes les energy, that is, ξ > ξˆ. Hence,
from the equilibrium conditions in (9) we get
v˙(ξˆ) = p(g) + ξˆp˙(g) < p(g) + ξp˙(g) = v˙(ξ).
The previous expression implies that ξˆ is greater
than ξ, which contradicts our initial hypothesis.
Therefore, ‖ξ‖ 6= ‖ξˆ‖, and from Proposition 4 we
conclude that when all users have the same valu-
ation the total demand strictly increases with the
number of users, that is, ‖ξ‖ < ‖ξˆ‖.
Now, we show that if the marginal cost function
C˙(·) is unbounded then the total demand reaches
a boundary as the population grows. If the cost
function is bounded, then users would consume any
amount of energy without paying significant prices.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
If C˙(·) is unbounded, then the total demand reaches
an upper bound as the number of users increase.
That is, ‖µ‖ → Ko and ‖ξ‖ → Ks as N → ∞, for
Ko,Ks ∈ R. Moreover, if all users have the same
valuation function with v˙i(0) > p(0), then the in-
dividual demand decreases as the population grows,
that is, µi → 0 and ξi → 0 as N →∞.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that the op-
timal aggregate demand ‖µ‖ is unbounded, that is,
‖µ‖ → ∞ as N →∞. Hence, for every user i with
positive demand µi > 0 the following equilibrium
condition follows from (7)
lim
N→∞
v˙i(µi) = lim
N→∞
C˙(‖µ‖).
If C˙(·) is unbounded, then
lim
g→∞
C˙(g)→∞.
Hence, our initial hypothesis imply that v˙i(µi) →
∞ as N →∞, which contradicts Assumption 1 be-
cause v(·) is not differentiable. Therefore, we con-
clude that if C˙(·) is unbounded, then the total de-
mand is bounded, that is, there exists some Ko ∈ R
such that ‖µ‖ → Ko as N →∞. Moreover, we can
use a similar argument to prove that the aggregate
demand in the NE (‖ξ‖) is also upper bounded by
some positive number Ks.
Besides, if all users have the same valuation func-
tion, i.e., vi(x) = vj(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R and
i, j ∈ P , then they have the same demand, that is,
ξi = ξ¯ and µi = µ¯ for all i ∈ P . If the total demand
is bounded, then
lim
N→∞
µ¯ = lim
N→∞
‖µ‖
N
≤ lim
N→∞
Ko
N
= 0.
Therefore, the demand of each user µ¯ tends to zero
as N grows. Likewise, ξ¯ → 0 as N →∞.
With the previous results we can prove that the
demand ratio ‖ξ‖/‖µ‖ reaches an upper bound as
the number of users increases (if the price function
p(·) is linear).
Proof. If vi(x) = vj(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R and
i, j ∈ P , then all users have the same demand, that
is, ξi = ξ¯ and µi = µ¯ for all user i ∈ P . From
Lemma 3 the demand of users tends to zero as the
number of users increase. Hence, the equilibrium
conditions in (7) and (9) lead to
lim
N→∞
v˙i(ξ¯) = lim
ξ¯→0
v˙(ξ¯) = p(‖ξ‖) (27)
and
lim
N→∞
v˙i(µ¯) = lim
µ¯→0
v˙(µ¯) = C˙(‖µ‖). (28)
From (27) and (28) we obtain
v˙(0) = p(‖ξ‖) = p(‖µ‖) + ‖µ‖ p˙(‖µ‖).
If p(·) is linear then ‖ξ‖ = 2 ‖µ‖ .
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The next theorem shows that the price of anarchy
equals zero, that is, the customer surplus in the
worst case NE is arbitrarily smaller than the social
optimum.
Proof of Theorem 3. Observe that only users with
positive demand affect the efficiency ratio, because
Ui(0, q−i) = 0 (see (5)). Therefore, henceforth we
assume that µi > 0.
Now, let us find an upper bound of the aggregate
valuations at the Nash and the optimal equilibria.
On one hand, from the concavity of the valuation
functions we have vi(µi) ≥ vi(0) + µiv˙i(µi). Since
v˙i(0) = 0, then vi(µi) ≥ µiv˙i(µi). Summing over
all users and using the conditions of the optimal
equilibrium in (7) we obtain∑
i
vi(µi) ≥ ‖µ‖ p(‖µ‖) + ‖µ‖
2
p˙(‖µ‖). (29)
On the other hand, from the concavity of the val-
uation functions we obtain vi(ξi) ≥ vi(µi) + (ξi −
µi)v˙i(ξi). Likewise, summing over all agents and us-
ing the conditions of the Nash equilibrium in (9)
results16∑
i
vi(ξi) ≥
∑
i
vi(µi) +A(ξ,µ) +B(ξ,µ), (30)
where A(ξ,µ) = (‖ξ‖ − ‖µ‖)p(‖ξ‖) and B(ξ,µ) =∑
i ξi(ξi − µi)p˙(‖ξ‖). Since ξi ≥ 0 and ‖ξ‖ ≥ ‖µ‖,
we can obtain the following lower bound of B(ξ,µ)
B(ξ,µ) ≥ ξ(‖ξ‖ − ‖µ‖) = Bˆ(ξ,µ) (31)
With (30) and (31) we express the efficiency ratio
as
r(ξ,µ) =
∑
i vi(ξi)− ‖ξ‖ p(‖ξ‖)∑
i vi(µi)− ‖µ‖ p(‖µ‖)
≥
∑
i vi(µi) + Γ(ξ,µ)− C(‖ξ‖)∑
i vi(µi)− C(‖µ‖)
, (32)
where Γ(ξ,µ) = A(ξ,µ) + Bˆ(ξ,µ).
Let us represent the right hand side of (32) as
the following function that depends on the total
valuation
∑
i vi(µi)
Ξ(x) =
x− y
x− z
, (33)
16Observe that (29) and (30) hold with equality when the
valuation functions are linear.
where x =
∑
i vi(µi), y = C(‖ξ‖) − Γ(ξ,µ) and
z = C(‖µ‖). We know that 1 ≥ Ξ(x), which im-
plies that y ≥ z; therefore, the function Ξ(x) is
increasing with respect to x.
The function in (33) help us to find a lower bound
to the efficiency ratio. Observe that Ξ(x) ≥ Ξ(x−ǫ),
for ǫ ≥ 0. Hence, we obtain a lower bound replacing∑
i vi(µi) by its lower bound in (29), resulting
Ξ(x) ≥
‖µ‖
2
p˙(‖µ‖) + Bˆ(ξ,µ)−D(ξ,µ)
‖µ‖
2
p˙(‖µ‖)
, (34)
where D(ξ,µ) = ‖µ‖ (p(‖ξ‖)− p(‖µ‖)). Note that
(34) holds with equality when the valuation func-
tions are linear, because in that case the inequality
in (29) holds with equality.
Finally, if p(·) is linear, then the right hand side
of (34) becomes
Ξ(x) ≥ r˜(ξ,µ)
=
(
‖µ‖2 + (‖ξ‖ − ‖µ‖)(ξ − ‖µ‖)
) 1
‖µ‖
. (35)
From Lemma 3 we know that if C˙(·) is unbounded
and all users have the same valuation, then ξi → 0
as N →∞. Therefore, ξ → 0, which leads (35) to
r˜(ξ,µ)→ 2− η, (36)
where η = ‖ξ‖/‖µ‖ . From Lemma 1 we know that
when all users have the same valuation η → 2 as
N → ∞, which makes (36) equal to zero. Hence,
the worst efficiency loss occurs when all users have
the same linear valuation function, the price p(·) is
linear, and N →∞.
5.4. Properties of the Mechanism
This subsection shows results related with the
impossibility of having a mechanism that satisfies
budget balance and we prove the properties of two
instances of the mechanism.
Let us introduce some notation for the following
results. Let θ =
∑
i∈P
∥∥q−i∥∥ = (N − 1) ‖q‖ and
ρi =
∥∥q−i∥∥ /θ, which satisfies ∑i∈P ρi = 1. The
previous variables allow us to rewrite the total in-
centives as∑
i∈P
Ii(q) = θ
(∑
i∈P
ρih(ρiθ)− p
(
θ
N − 1
))
.
(37)
The following proof shows that it is not possible
to have mechanisms with the budget balance prop-
erty.
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Proof of Theorem 4. Let us assume by contradic-
tion that there exists some function h(·) such that
the incentives satisfy
∑
i∈P Ii(q) = 0. Therefore,
we can rewrite (37) as
p
(
θ
N − 1
)
=
∑
i∈P
ρih(ρiθ). (38)
Now, we consider two scenarios. First, if all users
have the same consumption, represented by the vec-
tor ρˆ with ρˆi = ρˆj =
1
N
for all i, j ∈ P , then, (38)
becomes
p
(
θ
N − 1
)
= h
(
θ
N
)
. (39)
Second, if all except one user have positive con-
sumption, represented by the vector ρ˜ with ρ˜i = 0
and ρ˜j =
1
N−1 for all j 6= i, then, assuming that
limρ
j
→0 ρjh(ρjθ) = 0 (38) becomes
p
(
θ
N − 1
)
= h
(
θ
N − 1
)
. (40)
Equations (39) and (40) are valid only when θ = 0
(for N finite). Therefore, we find a contradiction
and conclude that we cannot find a function h(·)
that satisfies the budget balance property.
The next result shows the conditions to have in-
centive compatibility in a mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us consider a vector µˆ
equal to µ except for its ith entry, which is equal
to zero. Hence, µˆj = µj for all j 6= i and µˆi = 0,
which leads to ‖µˆ‖ =
∥∥µˆ−i∥∥ = ∥∥µ−i∥∥. From the
optimality condition in (7) we know that
Wi(µ) ≥Wi(µˆ)
= Ii(µˆ) =
∥∥µ−i∥∥ (h(∥∥µ−i∥∥)− p(∥∥µ−i∥∥)) .
Therefore, if h(
∥∥µ−i∥∥) − p(∥∥µ−i∥∥) ≥ 0, then
Wi(µ) ≥ 0.
The next result shows an instance of the proposed
mechanism that has budget deficit.
Proof of Proposition 2. Observe that h(·) in (13) is
increasing, because p(·) is increasing. Therefore,
Ii(q) =
∥∥q−i∥∥ (p(∥∥q−i∥∥)− p(‖q‖)) ≤ 0.
Hence, we conclude that
∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≤ 0.
Moreover, h(
∥∥µ−i∥∥) = p(∥∥µ−i∥∥), satisfying the
conditions of Proposition 1.
The next result shows an instance of the proposed
mechanism that has budget surplus.
Proof of Proposition 3. With (14) we can write
ρih(ρiθ) =
zi
kθ
p(zi),
where zi = θkρi and k =
N
N−1 . Let t(g) = gp(g),
which is convex (see Assumption 2), then
∑
i∈P
zi
kθ
p(zi) =
∑
i∈P
N
Nkθ
t(zi) ≥
N
kθ
t
(
1
N
∑
i∈P
zi
)
.
(41)
Here we have that
∑
i∈P zi = kθ, therefore (41)
becomes
∑
i∈P
zi
kθ
p(zi) ≥ p
(
θ
N − 1
)
. (42)
We can use the lower bound (42) in (37) to show
that
∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≥ 0.
Moreover, we know from Proposition 1 that
this mechanism is individually rational since
h(
∥∥µ−i∥∥) = p( NN−1 ∥∥µ−i∥∥) ≥ p(∥∥µ−i∥∥). The in-
equality follows since p(·) is increasing (see Assump-
tion 1).
5.5. Experimental Setup
The stability of the system depends on its dy-
namics, i.e., on how customers update their actions
in response to price changes. We assume that each
customer uses a load management system that finds
the action (i.e., demand) that maximizes either Ui
or Wi (if the customers receive incentives). Here
we leverage the theory of population games to de-
fine the system’s dynamics that guarantee stability
and convergence to either ξ or µ (in the case with
incentives).
In particular, we assume that each load man-
agement system has built-in some evolutionary dy-
namics configured maximize the customer’s profit
[51, 52, 53]. The evolutionary dynamics describe
how populations of agents, who participate in a
game, update their strategies to maximize a fitness
function. We can maximize the customer’s profit
making the fitness function equal to the marginal
profit; thus, the evolutionary dynamics resemble
a distributed gradient based optimization method
[54, 55]. We use the evolutionary dynamics because,
thanks to the concavity of the surplus functions, we
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can guarantee that the system is asymptotically sta-
ble.
We configure the evolutionary dynamics as fol-
lows. Each customer has some resources (e.g., en-
ergy) and decides whether to use them to perform
tasks (e.g., turn on appliances). In other words, the
customers have two strategies, whether to use or
not the resources. In this case, the benefit of using
the resources equals to the marginal profit. On the
contrary, idle resources do not report benefits nor
losses. Thus, in the equilibrium both strategies give
the same benefit, that is, the dynamics balance the
benefit between both strategies. This also implies
that in the equilibrium the marginal profit equals
to zero, as required to satisfy the FOC.
We find the optimal equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium using the Population Dynamics Tool-
box in [56]. We refer the interested reader to [57]
for more details on the implementation.
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